As I pointed out in yesterday’s column, Android may be causing huge headaches for Google, since things aren’t quite working in their favor. Take Samsung, who was so busy touting the improved hardware and software features of the Galaxy S4 smartphone that they barely mentioned Android. Consider that some mobile handset makers customize Android in ways that it may make it barely recognizable, and HTC with the One smartphone is yet another offender.

But it’s not just a problem of different themes and bundled apps. Amazon, for example, took Android and buried it beneath a custom interface that shows little if any resemblance to the original. Take a poll of Kindle tablet users, and I wonder how many will realize they own an Android tablet. Sure, the truth is out there, but most people don’t pay attention to our little games of inside baseball.

In Asia, you can buy loads of Android tablets for very little money, but it may be a version of Android that’s very different from the one that Google created that doesn’t even support such services as Google Play. Open source and free licensing combine to make it impossible to have an identifiable brand. With iOS, BlackBerry and Windows Phone, you can depend on a consistent look and feel to the OS. You know what you’re getting, and what it does, for better or worse.

But Google is not quite in the same business as Apple, BlackBerry or Microsoft. The latter three are in the business of selling hardware and services, although most of Microsoft’s income comes from Windows and Office. Google is mostly selling ad space. Motorola Mobility may be the exception, but it’s still a skeleton of what it was years ago before smartphones emerged triumphant.

Google’s efforts to enforce consistency and reliable update policies have gone nowhere. Google’s other hardware platforms, Google TV and Chrome OS, have not yet shown any indication of potential success. Sure, there are hundreds of millions of Android devices out there, but has Google’s bottom line grown much as a result?

Other than winding down development, it’s not as if killing Android would present a huge problem. Existing hardware licensees could still use the versions they are running. Indeed, most Android hardware out there is saddled with fairly old versions of the OS, so a lack of updates won’t mean a thing. Google could still do critical security and bug fix updates on a maintenance schedule for those who care. In a year or two, smartphones will be running other platforms, or just fork Android and develop their own custom versions. End of story.

Now this doesn’t mean Android is necessarily doomed to failure. It’s fair to say that there are ways for Google to deliver more financial success. Google could, for example, issue new contracts that require modest licensing fees for updated versions, put strict controls on theme changes, and add a requirement to push critical OS updates. Sure, some handset makers may decide it’s time to move elsewhere, but it may just be worth the modest expense to keep it going. At the same time, Google could make a deal with Microsoft over patent rights so individual handset makers won’t have to be concerned over such matters.

In exchange, Google can step up promotion, creating for once a distinct branding for Android that extends beyond a handful of Nexus branded devices. There are obviously distinct positives about Android that can be touted, such as superior multitasking, with the ability to run apps side by side. On a tablet, that can make a huge difference if you want to do real productive work. When it comes to apps, the quantities are sufficient. It’s time to tighten the requirements, and get rid of the junk. Today, iOS is the place to go if a developer wants to put food on the table. Google could certainly curate new app submissions in a more stringent fashion to reduce the chances for malware, and, in general, provide higher quality software for Android users. By making sure more Android gear has the latest software, fragmentation is reduced, making it easier for developers to reach a wider audience.

It doesn’t necessarily mean that Google becomes Apple in building a walled garden. But the lack of controls merely creates the climate for chaos. That Android is being used by handset makers in ways that don’t benefit Google’s bottom line clearly demonstrates that there is a need for a middle ground.

Andy Rubin, “Mr. Android,” the inventor of the OS, has moved elsewhere in the company, thus creating  the climate for huge changes. This doesn’t mean that Android is destined to merge with the Web-based Chrome OS. But the new leadership may make it possible to fix what ails the OS and make it a more powerful contender against iOS.

As you might have seen with a recent high-level defection from iOS to Android — and I’ve been testing a Samsung Galaxy S3 myself for several weeks — the OS has some well-thought features that trump what you get on the iOS. But there are ragged edges and instabilities that, after many upgrades, still haven’t been fixed. That more people defect from Android to iOS than the reverse clearly indicates customer dissatisfaction. Google can do better, assuming the company isn’t just going to let Android die on the vine and move elsewhere some day.

As with governments, Apple and the fourth estate haven’t had such a cozy relationship, particularly after the return of Steve Jobs in the 1990s. Although Jobs delivered great talking points in his occasional interviews, he was always wary of the media unless Apple had full control of the message. These days, Apple has largely inherited that approach, although corporate PR seems to reach out a little more often to a few selected media resources.

In the absence of regular communications, however, some so-called journalists simply make things up. Or they come out with outrageous interpretations of things Apple has announced, will announce, or might announce.

Take the iWatch as a blatant example. Even if Apple really has 100 engineers working on such a device, that doesn’t prove that it will ever see the light of day. If Apple’s project assignment breakdown was ever disclosed, you’d probably see thousands of designers and engineers working on different technologies and potential products at any one time. You expect that with a company that wants to remain at the cutting-edge.

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Last October, Apple introduced a major refresh for the iMac. The 2012 version was thinner, at least at the edges, promised a better quality picture, and, oh yes, didn’t have an optical drive. Apple made a huge deal touting the fact that the iMac was a mere 5mm thick at the edges, although it fattened considerably in the middle. Whether this is something anyone really cared about is another question, but Apple has this thing about cutting-edge industrial design.

No doubt lots of Mac users were ready to buy one of these beasts, especially since the existing iMac, dating back to 2011, was decidedly long in the tooth as personal computers go. No doubt sales had fallen considerably, and a new model is always certain to reboot sales. Yes, Apple certainly introduced lots of new gear in the last few months of 2012 — maybe too many products.

Well, in the December quarter, Apple had a shortfall of some 700,000 Macs, which made sales tank worse than the rest of the PC industry. And that’s a huge change. The main reason is that the assembly process for the new iMac is extremely sophisticated, as usual with Apple, and thus they fell way behind in building enough product. A friend, for example, bought the 21.5-inch model, due to ship in November, some time in the middle of December. It was a stock configuration, but it didn’t arrive until early February, although delivery times no doubt depended on the dealer (it wasn’t Apple in this case). Those who ordered the powerful 27-inch model were even worse off.

Now Apple probably shipped so few iMacs in 2012, it probably doesn’t account for much in the scheme of things. They could have waited and taken more time to ramp production, while perhaps cutting prices on the 2011 models to keep Macs moving. Sure, the 2012 version is prettier and faster, but not so much faster as to make the previous model look slow by comparison. And being able to get one with a built-in optical drive has its attractions.

So basically, the 2012 iMac is essentially a 2013 iMac, except for the official model designation. Surely supply chain wiz Tim Cook must have realized how it would all turn out. That’s the skill he’s mastered, and surely he understood that Apple might have been better off to just leave well enough alone and introduce the iMac as a 2013 model, say, in January. He could then promise delivery within a reasonable amount of time and not leave customers disappointed. Apple’s revenue for the December quarter would have been higher, profits higher, and maybe Wall Street would not have freaked as easily as it did over unfounded rumors of lack of demand for the iPhone 5. And remember that claim has yet to be proven.

As it stands, there have been no media invites from Apple so far in 2013. Few expect any until April, so Apple hasn’t had a chance to do what they do best, which is to launch and promote amazing new products and services. So the media echo chamber and financial analysts remain consumed with the company’s perceived problems, without recognizing that the reality may be very different. Besides, it’s not as if those who were so wrong in the first place will admit that fact should Apple deliver credible sales numbers for the current quarter.

Now it’s very possible Apple didn’t anticipate that iMac production problems would be so bad, or threw the dice hoping to come out ahead. It was as much a marketing miss as a production miss. Consider the plight of Mac users (or those wanting to switch to the platform) who might have bought an iMac in the December quarter had one been available for near-immediate shipment.

True, Apple also had problems building enough iPhones and iPad minis. But few credit them for having more demand than supplies.

Now this doesn’t mean Apple shouldn’t use exotic production schemes to separate Macs and mobile gear from the rest of the pack. That’s what makes Apple special, and few tech companies take the same approach. One that might, HTC, has encountered production delays in getting the latest version of the One smartphone to market.

At the end of the day, however, the iMac is a really great computer, though again I don’t consider the lack of an optical drive to make much sense, nor the ultra-slim edges. If you look at the thing from the front, what difference does it make? I also question the decision to make it essentially impossible to upgrade RAM on the 21.5-inch model. Sure, Apple is into computing appliances, but this approach doesn’t seem to make very much sense. But I don’t think it makes sense on the MacBook Air or the MacBook Pro with Retina display either. It’s almost as if Apple is channeling the approach Steve Jobs took with the very first Macintosh in 1984, and where’s the logic in that? Or in announcing a product refresh weeks before it can be delivered, while gutting sales of the existing model.

Just this week, I read yet another uninformed piece suggesting that Apple and Samsung are barking up the wrong tree in trying to developing a smartwatch, or an iWatch if you will. Typical of many of the comments on the subject, the issues are being viewed in the context of existing products, not the potential. These comments also ignore Apple’s expertise, which is to make nascent or previously unsatisfied markets relevant.

In other words, they ignore the lessons of history.

Take the iPod. Before that product arrived in 2001, there were digital music players, all right. I reviewed some of them for ZDNet, but they pretty much went nowhere. If you used them, you’d know why. The interfaces were lousy, and download speeds were pathetic. Apple’s brilliance was to use FireWire for speedier throughput (later USB 2), to develop a user friendly interface and control system, and make it sync almost seamlessly with iTunes. This combination created a market that previously didn’t exist.

For the iPhone in 2007, yes there were smartphones, mostly in the BlackBerry mold sporting tiny physical keypads, which were in wide use by business professionals and power users. Although blasted by the critics for the inefficiencies of the virtual keyboard, the iPhone broke through and became a popular mainstream consumer gadget. The other companies took notice, and delivered their own imitations for better or worse. But only Samsung managed to gain any traction with its intended iPhone beater, the Galaxy S series.

Despite being touted by Microsoft for years as the next great thing, it took Apple to make tablets relevant with the iPad. Everything that came after, except perhaps the Surface tablet and those dreadful tablet/PC convertibles, owed something to Apple.

That takes us to the smartwatch. There has been a lot of speculation, unconfirmed as usual, that Apple is actively developing an iWatch, with some 100 engineers working on the project. That may seem a lot, although Apple has more than enough resources to fund loads of development efforts, but very few new products actually make it to the Apple Store. In turn, Samsung promises to release their own smartwatch, no doubt something that will be highly influenced by what they expect Apple to deliver.

But the situation with smartwatches almost harkens back to the early days of digital music players. Yes, there are such products, including the Pebble and I’m Watch, but they aren’t very smart. They are meant to serve as peripherals for existing smartphones and little more. Some may be useful for exercise, but you get the point. They are nothing unless you have a smartphone (or tablet) with which to pair via Bluetooth. No wonder few are impressed. Besides, they don’t sell very well.

To think Apple would play that game with their own concept of an iWatch is foolish. Why bother?

One possibility being ignored by most of those so-called tech or financial pundits is a fully-functioning standalone smartwatch. What I mean is a gadget that’s basically a limited-feature smartphone all by itself, without linking to any other gadget. You’ll be able to place and receive calls, and handle limited app functions, possibly including turn-by-turn navigation, the requisite exercise routines, and so forth and so on. Sure, using a number keypad to place phone calls may be a tad awkward on a tiny screen, but Siri would compensate. Indeed, accurate voice direction would be a prerequisite for making such a device work in the real world, and it would come with a Bluetooth mic/headset for added flexibility.

Certainly Dick Tracy never had to rely on a paired phone to use his wrist radio.

In the real world, putting all that stuff into a device the size of a watch may be difficult, though I suppose some of the parts would be placed in the wrist band, including, perhaps, the antenna. Having a much smaller display, and judicious selection of power efficient components, would make it possible to get decent battery life despite the size. A purchase price between $199 and $299, unlocked, might make the iWatch a contender as a cheap iPhone alternative.

Apple’s advantage in building such a gadget is that they do not just use off-the-shelf parts. They’d have to custom design chips, displays and batteries. Performance and power efficiencies would be paramount, and the iWatch would have to offer a genuine iOS experience, even if it’s slimmed down.

I am not for the moment suggesting that building an iWatch, making it work properly, and selling it for an affordable price would be simple tasks. Success would require a company with the design savvy, engineering expertise and almost unlimited resources of an Apple Inc. In contrast, the products other companies have produced as intended smartwatches don’t even come close. No wonder there are few buyers, and interest is almost non-existent.

Besides, I don’t claim to have any inside information that an iWatch, in any form, really exists, or will exist in the near future. But the mistake Apple’s critics make over and over again is viewing the company in comparison with other tech powerhouses. Once and for all, that is almost always a big mistake.